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Cognitive Warfare and
Young Black Males in America
Perry L. Moriearty* & William Carson**
I. INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s, deep into America's Wars on Crime and Drugs, an
incursion commenced against a target that had, to that point, remained
largely outside the crosshairs. Prompted by rising crime rates and a handful
of high-profile incidents, politicians, the media, and much of the public
became consumed by what they characterized as a looming threat. What
made this target distinct was that it belonged to a cohort traditionally
shielded from public scorn by both law and custom. The target was a subset
of America's own children. Waged in race-neutral terms, this war's racial
connotations were unmistakable. The most violent, the most adult-like, and
the most amoral of adolescents were young black males.
This incursion bore many of the classic features of other modern
American social wars: rhetorical excess, political extremism, graphic media,
punitive policies, and, perhaps most critically, the casting of the enemy as a
moral reprobate.' To this end, the image of the adolescent "super-predator,"
a term a Princeton professor coined in 1995,2 was a particularly salient
symbol.
This Article considers the fallout from America's "super-predator" war.
Some of it was unambiguous. During the 1990s, nearly every state in the
country enacted laws that made it easier to try kids as adults, expanded
criminal court sentencing authority over juvenile offenders, and modified or

* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful to the members of The
Journal of Gender, Race & Justice for inviting me to participate in their 15th Symposium, "War
on ... The Fallout of Declaring War on Social Issues," and for editing this piece so carefully and
thoughtfully. Thank you to Will Carson for making this article much better than it would have been
and to Kyle, Mia, and Rowan for their endless support.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2012. 1 would like to thank Professor
Moriearty for inviting me to participate in this Article and the Criminal Law faculty at the University
of Minnesota for their valuable contributions to the ideas in this Article. A special thanks to Sonia
McNeil and my family for encouraging me and allowing me to disappear for days at a time while
working on this Article.
1.

See infra Part II (discussing the common attributes of U.S. social wars).

2. John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators,WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27,
1995, at 23, available at http://cooley.libarts.wsu.edu/schwartj/criminology/dilulio.pdf
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eliminated juvenile court confidentiality laws.3 These changes have been
called the "broadest and most sustained legislative crackdown ever on
serious offenses committed by youth within the jurisdictional ages of
American Juvenile Courts."4 The result was the incarceration of literally
thousands of youth, the majority of whom were black males.' By 1998,
African-Americans constituted about 15% of youth under age eighteen,6 but
nearly two-thirds of those transferred to adult court,' a disparity for which
crime commission rates could not begin to account. The country continues to
feel the broader economic and sociological reverberations of these numbers.
Today, nearly one in three African-American males in their twenties is under
the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system.
The focus of this Article, however, is on a less visible set of
phenomena. Why is it that we, as a country, were so willing during the
1990s to depart from our traditional posture of restraint toward child
lawbreakers and adopt policies that have had such a devastating impact on
so many of them? And why, now that we know how disproportionately
damaging these policies are, have we done virtually nothing to change them?

3.

See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.

4. Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological
Battleground, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
5. According to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the number of youth
incarcerated in adult jails increased by 208% between 1990 and 2004. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY,
NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, FACT SHEET: YOUTH UNDER AGE 18 IN THE ADULT

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2006). Significantly, studies conducted during this period confirmed
that African-American youth were far more likely to be charged as adults and receive sentences of
incarceration than white or Latino youth. JOLANTA JUSZKIEWICZ, BLDG. BLOCKS FOR YOUTH,
YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME: IS JUSTICE SERVED? 5-6, 10 (2000), availableat http://www.cclp.org/

documents/BBY/YouthCrime Adult Time.pdf (providing a study of more than 2500 cases filed in
eighteen of the largest jurisdictions in the country demonstrated that African-American youth were
disproportionately charged in adult court and were more likely than white or Latino youth to receive
a sentence of incarceration); see also ELEANOR HINTON HOYTT ET AL., THE ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND., 8: PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM: REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
JUVENILE DETENTION (2001), availableat http://www.aecforg/upload/publicationfiles/reducing%

racial%20disparities.pdf (documenting the significant increases in racial disproportionality in
juvenile detention facilities during the 1990s).
6.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: SECTION 1.

POPULATION 22 (1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/98statab/sasec l.pdf

7. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF 40 COUNTIES, 1998: JUVENILE FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURTS 1 (1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdfljf
dcc98.pdf; EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2009), available at http://www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/jfs.pdf.
8.
AND

MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER (1995), available at

http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rdyoungblack_5yrslater.pdf; MICHAEL TONRY,
PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 11 (2011) [hereinafter TONRY, PUNISHING
RACE].
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Part of the answer may lie in what this Article calls the "social psychology
of social war." Recent research into the mechanics and effects of "social
cognition"9 suggests that preexisting stereotypes of the groups with which
people are associated largely shape our perceptions of individuals.10 It
further suggests that we rely on these stereotypes unconsciously and
automatically, often without even realizing we are doing it." We also now
know that both the content of our stereotypes and the frequency with which
they are activated and applied are especially susceptible to certain outside
influences.1 2 Importantly, several studies from the last two decades suggest
that the graphic media imagery, political posturing, militaristic rhetoric, and
Manichean moralizing often associated with American social wars are
among these influences. These images and ideas impact not just the type of
associations we make with our "enemies," conflating Muslims with
terrorism, Latinos with drug smuggling, and African-Americans with crime,
for instance, but also the likelihood that we will draw upon these
associations when we evaluate them. The more negative the association, the
more negative the evaluation-and the more likely it is that we will support
punitive responses to the threat we perceive.13
In the case of the "super-predator" war, however, it was not only the
mental associations,but also the mental dissociations that were critical. At
the same time the "super-predator" war amplified the American public's
predisposition to associate adolescents of color, and in particular young
black males, with violence and moral depravity, it also led the public to
dissociate young black males from the one trait that should not have been up
for debate: their youth. The result was a veritable feedback loop whose
cognitive output, the mental imprint of "morally impoverished" "super-

9. Experts have defined social cognition as "how ordinary people think about people and how
they think they think about people." SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION I
(2d ed. 1991); see also Kevin N. Ochsner & Matthew D. Liebennan, The Emergence of Social
Cognitive Neuroscience, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 717, 721-25 (2001).

10. Part III of this Article discusses the basic proposition that our cognitive functioning
predisposes us to prejudice and stereotyping. Cf Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1256-57 (2002) (citing neuroscience as supporting the proposition that "basic
cognitive mechanisms . . . predispose us toward stereotypes"); Allen J. Hart et al., Differential
Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs. Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11 NEUROREPORT
2351, 2353-54 (2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-88
(1995) (linking social cognition theory to discrimination).
11.

Krieger, supranote 10.

12.

See, e.g., ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREw ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE

MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 49 (2001).

13.

See discussion infra Part Ill.
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predators,"l 4 continually fed its input. Thus, even as crime rates among
black youth have dropped steadily since the mid-1990s, these selfreinforcing associations and dissociations have prompted lawmakers and
their constituents to continue to support laws and policies that they know
disproportionately punish and incapacitate young black males.
Admittedly, factors other than social war and social psychology have
played a pivotal role in this dynamic. For instance, the history of race
relations in this country, changes in our attitudes toward punishment, rising
violent crime rates among adolescents, and conscious political strategy also
played a role." But a look at the juvenile justice policies and youth
imprisonment rates of other Western countries, even those that experienced a
similar spike in adolescent crime during the period in question, suggest that
we were extreme in our degree of political and social antipathy toward
young offenders and nearly alone in our willingness to champion policies
that punish them as harshly as adults. 16 Not coincidentally, we have also
been virtually alone in our willingness to wage what this Article
characterizes as a veritable domestic social war against them.
This Article proceeds in two primary parts. Part II traces the origins,
manifestations, and impact of the so-called American "super-predator" war
that emerged in the late 1980s and lasted until the early 2000s, when the War

14. These characterizations appeared in a now-infamous article written by former Princeton
Political Science Professor John Dilulio. See Dilulio, supra note 2, at 23-24.
15. See, e.g., TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra note 8, at 77-114 (arguing that the psychology
of American race relations, America's long-standing "economic, political, and social dominance of
blacks by whites," and the "Republican Southern Strategy of appealing to racial enmities and
anxieties" contributed to state and federal policymakers' willingness to enact criminal justice
policies that have a disparate impact on African-Americans).
16. Consider the Canadian experience. In 1998, in response to rising crime rates, the Canadian
federal government decided to replace its rehabilitation-oriented Young Offenders Act of 1982 with
a new Youth Criminal Justice Act, which placed greater emphasis on accountability and the nature
of the offense. See Anthony Doob & Jane Sprott, Punishing Youth Crime in Canada, 8 PUNISHMENT
& Soc'y 233 (2008). Like the slew of state laws enacted in the United States during the 1990s, the
Youth Criminal Justice Act placed greater emphasis on accountability and the nature of the offense
than the rehabilitation and the characteristics of the offender. Id. However, despite significant
political pressure to lower the age of criminal responsibility below age twelve, the Canadian
legislature resisted. Id. Nor would the legislature reconsider its adult court transfer laws, which were
historically restricted to a small group of serious violent offenders and sex offenders. Id. In fact, the
Youth Criminal Justice Act reversed course in some significant ways, establishing considerably
more options for dealing with cases informally and keeping juvenile offenders in the community. Id.
Finally, and most symbolically, the Youth Criminal Justice Act continues to state as one of its
objectives that it strives for rehabilitation of offenders. Id.; see also Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C.
2002, c. 1 (Can.), available at http://laws-lois justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/Y-1.5/. Indeed, even in England
and Wales, where youth can be transferred to adult court for particularly serious crimes, juvenile
rather than criminal justice policies continue to apply until youth reach the age of eighteen and are
deemed criminally responsible. NEAL HAZEL, YOUTH JUSTICE BD., CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON
OF YOUTH JUSTICE 35 (2008), available at http://www.yjb.gov.uk/publications/Resources/
Downloads/Cross national final.pdf.
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on Terror took center stage. Beginning with a brief discussion of the history
and anatomy of modem American social wars, it explores the laws, policies,
politics, and rhetoric that coincided with dramatic increases in the
incarceration of black youth during the "super-predator" era. Part III
considers the role that social psychology may have played in this
progression and in the progression of social wars more generally. Drawing
upon recent studies into causes, functions, and consequences of social
cognition," this Article argues that stereotypes linking race, adolescence,
and crime drove, and at the same time reinforced, the manifestations of war
Part II describes. The result was a self-reinforcing feedback loop that has
altered the social meaning of "young black male" in profound and
intractable ways. Because the majority of the people in this country now
harbor such stereotypes about the criminality, deviance, and adultness of
young black males, large segments of the public remain willing to enact,
administer, and support policies that cause substantial and disproportionate
harm to this segment of our youth population and are among the harshest in
the Western world.
II.

THE ANATOMY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL WARS

Over the last half century, this country has been in a perpetual state of
war. From Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, to the Wars on Crime and
Drugs, to our current War on Terror, to smaller incursions against cancer
and immigration, we, as a nation, have spent the last fifty years in an everpresent posture of social anxiety and metaphorical combat. Each of this
century's most prominent social wars has followed a similar pattern: an
intense period of political posturing about the dangers of the chosen target,
accompanied by episodic media coverage of a few sensationalized incidents,
followed by a period of public outcry and polls that reflect the public's
mounting fear of the target, followed finally by a flurry of punitive laws at
both the federal and state level that lawmakers have justified as efforts to
reassure an anxious public.18 More often than not, these laws have a

17. The interplay between social psychology and American social wars plainly implicates
research beyond social cognition. In particular, Lawrence Bobo's recent work on the links between
racial resentment and policy punitiveness, see Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by
Design: The War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the CriminalJustice System, 73 Soc. RES.
445, 445-72 (2006), and Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz's work on attitudes toward punishment, see
generally MARK PEFFLEY & JON HURWITZ, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE REALITIES OF
BLACKS AND WHITES (2010), suggest that the political and social casting of metaphorical "enemies"
also impacts conscious beliefs and attitudes toward punishment and the willingness of EuroAmericans to rationalize an obviously unjust justice system. For a comprehensive and highly
accessible overview of this body of research, see chapter four of TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra
note 8.
18.

See infra Part H (discussing the elements and sequence of the Wars on Crime and Drugs);
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disproportionately negative impact on a racial or ethnic "out-group."19
America's Wars on Crime and Drugs are illustrative. The "super-predator"
war followed a similar pattern. One difference, however, is that unlike the
racial minorities and poor whites the Wars on Crime and Drugs swept up,
our adolescent population had never before experienced the groundswell of
social antipathy that the "super-predator" war generated.
A. The Wars on Crime andDrugs

This Part retraces the origins and ramifications of the War on Crime and
the War on Drugs. It begins by recounting the ways in which politics and
media drove public support for the Wars' most punitive policies. Next, it
discusses the impact of these wars on racial minorities in the justice system.
1. Politics, Media, Public Opinion, and Lawmaking
a. The War on Crime
The "law and order" rhetoric that has dominated political discourse in
the United States for the last half century first emerged in the late 1950s.
Southern politicians, angered by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, called for a crackdown on the "hoodlums"

and "agitators" who challenged segregation and African-American
disenfranchisement.2 0 Crime officially took its place on the national political
scene a decade later with presidential candidate Barry Goldwater's thinly
veiled "crime in the streets" condemnation.21 "History shows us . .. that ...
nothing prepares the way for tyranny more than the failure of public officials
to keep the streets from bullies and marauders," Goldwater warned during
his acceptance speech at the 1964 Republican convention.22 That message
resonated with the public. By 1968, more than four in five U.S. citizens

see also Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. IncarcerationRates So High?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 419,425
(1999) ("[P]ublic nomination of crime as the nation's most pressing problem and public support for
harsh laws typically follow, not precede, media and political preoccupation with crime.").
19.

TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra note 8, at 77-114.

20.

Katherine Beckett & Theodore Sasson, The Originsofthe CurrentConservativeDiscourse

on Law and Order, in CONSERVATIVE AGENDAS AND CAMPAIGNS, THE RISE OF THE MODERN

"TOUGH ON CRIME" MOVEMENT 44, available at http://www.defendingjustice.org/con-agendas/
toughcrime.html.

21. See Gerald Caplan, Reflections on the Nationalization of Crime, 1964-1968, 3 LAW &
Soc. ORD. 583, 583-85 (1973).
22. Barry Goldwater, 1964 Acceptance Speech at the 28th Republican National Convention
(July 16, 1964), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/
goldwaterspeech.htm (providing a transcript of the speech).

Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in America

287

agreed that "law and order had broken down," that crime was on the rise,
and that "Negroes who start riots" were the cause. 2 3 Being "tough on crime"
has been a virtual political necessity ever since.24
The news media was an indispensable ally. This has been especially
true since the onset of the "soft news" era of the late 1990s. 25 Between 1990
and 1993, crime leapt from the fifth to the first most covered topic on the
national evening news. 26 By the end of the decade, coverage of homicides
had increased more than five-fold. 27 "If it bleeds, it leads," became the
mantra. 2 8 According to opinion polls, the American people believed the

23.

KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY

AMERICAN POLITICS 38 (1997).
24. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New
Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEo. L.J. 1385,
1396 tbl.1 (2006); see Beckett & Sasson, supra note 20, at 6. George H.W. Bush's use of the
infamous "Willie Horton" advertisement may be the starkest example. See George Bush and Willie
Horton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/04/opinion/george-bush-andwillie-horton.html. While on a furlough from a Massachusetts prison, Horton kidnapped a couple
and raped the woman. Id During the 1988 presidential campaign, Bush highlighted the incident as
evidence that "liberal Democrats," like his opponent, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis,
were soft on crime. Id. The ad is often credited with securing his eventual victory. See id. Analysts
often describe not one, but three, separate "Wars on Crime." The first is said to have begun in the
early part of the twentieth century; the second, during the Nixon administration; and the third,
shortly after Ronald Reagan took office. Kenneth Nunn, Race, Crime & the Pool of Surplus
Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" Was a "War on Blacks," 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381,
381 n.l (2002) (citing STEVEN WITSOSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED
PUBLIC POLICY (1990)). This Article treats the period beginning with the 1964 presidential election
and extending until 2001, when the War on Terror began, as a single War on Crime.
25. "Soft news" has been described as a set of story characteristics that often include a
sensationalized presentation format, a human interest theme, a lack of public policy content, and an
emphasis on dramatic subjects, such as crime. THOMAS E. PATTERSON, HARVARD UNIV., JOAN
SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON THE PRESS, POLITICS & PUB. POLICY, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: HOW
SOFT NEWS AND CRITICAL JOURNALISM ARE SHRINKING THE NEWS AUDIENCE AND WEAKENING
DEMOCRACY-AND WHAT NEWS OUTLETS CAN Do ABOUT IT 3-5 (2000), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/reports/soft-newsand-criticaljoumalism2000.
pdf
26. 1990 - The Year in Review, MEDIA MONITOR (Ctr. for Media and Pub. Affairs,
Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1991, at 2-3 (reporting that network evening news stories on crime aired
542 times; of these, stories on murder and homicide statistics aired 86 times, while stories on the
high-profile Marion Barry drug arrest aired 55 times); 1993 - The Year in Review, MEDIA MONITOR
(Ctr. for Media and Pub. Affairs, Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 2 (reporting that network
evening news stories on crime and drugs aired 1698 times; of these, 329 were stories on murder,
triple the number of murder stories that aired in 1992). For the decade as a whole, crime was by far
the number one news topic. The Media at the Millennium, MEDIA MONITOR (Ctr. for Media and Pub.
Affairs, Washington, D.C.), July-Aug. 2000, at 2-3 (reporting that during the 1990s, network news
programs produced 14,289 total crime stories-nearly 4000 more than the second most covered
topic, economy and business-and that "[s]ince 1993, when the networks' infatuation with crime
began, crime has been the number one news topic four out of seven years").
27.

The Media at the Millennium, supra note 26, at 3-4.

28.

See RICHARD L. FOX ET AL., TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE INAN AGE OF MEDIA
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hype. From 1994 to 1998, respondents to national polls consistently
identified crime as the most important problem the nation faced.29 In a 1997
Los Angeles Times poll, 80% of respondents stated that the media's portrayal
of violent crime had increased their personal fear of becoming a crime
victim. 30
Deeming them necessary to reassure an anxious public, lawmakers
followed each "law and order" panic wave with a series of executive actions
and legislative changes. In 1968, for example, in an attempt to neutralize the
attacks of Republican candidates contending that he was soft on crime, 3'
President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968,32 which increased funding for law enforcement, attempted to
overturn Supreme Court precedent protecting criminal defendants, and
provided for expanded use of wiretaps and Miranda-less confessions. The
Omnibus Bill was the first of many federal tough-on-crime laws that
legislatures would enact over the next three decades. These included the
Omnibus Bill's eventual successor, the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, which authorized more than thirty billion dollars
for crime prevention efforts, law enforcement, and state prison
construction. 34
More draconian were the laws individual states enacted during the War
on Crime. One quintessential example is California's three-strikes law,
which mandates twenty-five years to life sentences following conviction for
any third felony.3 s New Jersey's Megan's Law, which requires sex offender
registration and public notification, is another. 36 Today, more than half of all
FRENZY 6-7 (2d ed. 2007).
29. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on CriminalJustice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 397, 418 (2006) (citing
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

STATISTICS 2003, at 106 tbl.2.1 (2004)).
30. Greg Braxton, Ratings vs. Crime Rates, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1997, http://articles.latimes.
com/1997-06-04/local/me-654431 crime-stories.
31.
(2002).

Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1035, 1044

32. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 201-406, 82
Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006)).
33.

Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 24, at 1399.

34. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 20109,
30104, 30202, 30403, 30702, 30802, 31132, 31707, 31904, 40414, 40422, 40603, 90206, 200112,
200210, 210306, 250005, 270009, 310003, 310004 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13071-14223
(2006)).
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2010) (providing for a five-year enhancement for each
prior felony and an indeterminate life sentence of at least twenty-five years for a third felony).
36.

New Jersey enacted Megan's Law one month after the abduction, rape, and murder of

Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in America

289

states have habitual felony offender laws akin to California's three-strikes
law," and all fifty states have a version of Megan's Law. 38 In addition,
nearly every state has adopted truth-in-sentencing laws, mandatory
minimum sentencing laws, and zero-tolerance practices; these laws and
policies have resulted in harsher penalties and the virtual elimination of
rehabilitation programs.39
b. The War on Drugs
Launched on the heels of the War on Crime, the War on Drugs was
even more ubiquitous. Not heavily regulated during the first half of the
century, 40 drugs emerged as a potent political issue in the second half. In
1971, Richard Nixon declared drug abuse "Public Enemy No. 1 1 and
created a new agency, the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention,
which received enhanced funding for drug treatment and enforcement.42
This would be the first and the last time during the War on Drugs that more
funding went toward treatment than punishment. 43 By 1985, nearly fourfifths of funds lawmakers allocated to the drug problem went to law
enforcement. 44
Following in Nixon's footsteps, subsequent administrations

seven-year-old Megan Kanka by a convicted sex offender. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-12 to -19 (West
2001). Congress enacted a federal version of Megan's Law in 1996, which requires states to form
registries of offenders convicted of either sexually violent offenses or offenses against children. See
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program,
Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3096 (1996), amended by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16912 (2006)) (maintaining
earlier version). It also requires states to adopt strict registration requirements for convicted sex
offenders, verify the addresses of sex offenders annually for at least ten years, verify the addresses of
those classified as "sexually violent predators" for life, and requires law enforcement to disseminate
information about registered sex offenders to the public. Id.
37.

See Michael Tonry, Determinants ofPenalPolicies, 36 CRIME & JUST. 1, 27 (2007).

38. See Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1111, 1135 (2000).
39.

See TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra note 8, at 124.

40. ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC
AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 42-49 (2009).

41. The Nation: The New Public Enemy No. 1, TIME, June 28, 1971, http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905238-1,00.html.
42.

Id.

43. Frontline, Thirty Years ofAmerica's Drug War: A Chronology, PBS, http://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
44.

Beckett & Sasson, supranote 20, at 54.
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successfully used the War on Drugs to cast drug use as a moral problem.4 5
By framing drug addicts as aggressors rather than victims, the Reagan, Bush,
and Clinton Administrations' zero-tolerance policies toward drug use made
sense.46 The best known example, and a centerpiece of Ronald Reagan's
presidency, was Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" Campaign 4 7-a phrase she
coined while speaking at an Oakland grade school.48 Almost overnight,
thousands of "Just Say No" groups emerged,49 which largely targeted white
middle-class children.50 Under the rubric of "Just Say No," it was entirely a
matter of individual choice to use or become involved in drug use.
Again, the news media was only too happy to cooperate, and the
infiltration of crack cocaine into urban areas in the mid-1980s gave them
their storyline. 5 ' By 1986, major news magazines were running cover stories
calling crack the "The Plague Among Us." 52 The media focused, in
particular, on crack cocaine use by African-Americans and the alleged
"crack baby" epidemic, postulating a biological underclass of children who
would require state support for the rest of their lives.5 ' The media also linked
crack babies to other inner-city crime, such as prostitution and gang
violence. 54 "[C]rack bab[ies] '. . . bec[a]me a convenient symbol for an
aggressive war on drug users because of the implication that anyone who is
selfish enough to irreparably damage a child for the sake of a quick high
deserves retribution."' 55

45.

WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 40, at 64.

46. Cf Congressman Bob Barr & Eric Sterling, Debate at Georgetown University Law Center
(Mar. 14, 2001), in The War on Drugs: Fighting Crime or Wasting Time?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1537, 1539 (2001).
47.

Id.

48. Claire Suddath, BriefHistory: The War on Drugs, TIME, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.time.
com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html.
49.

Id.

50.

Id; Frontline,supra note 43.

51. See Susan Okie, The Epidemic That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.ny
times.com/2009/01/27/health/27coca.html?pagewanted=1 (giving examples of newspaper headings
surrounding the scare the "nationwide epidemic" produced).
52. CRAIG REINARMAN & HARRY G. LEVINE, CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 4 (1997).
53. Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 841, 854 (2010).
54. Kimani Paul-Emile, Making Sense ofDrug Regulation:A Theory ofLaw for Drug Control
Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 691, 734 (2010).
55. Lindsey Tanner, Study Fights 'CrackBaby' Syndrome, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 27, 2001
(quoting Dr. Wendy Chavkin of Columbia University). As it turns out, cocaine is no more harmful to
fetuses than alcohol or tobacco. Okie, supra note 51. Doctors today seem determined to avoid
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Federal and state lawmakers took swift action in an apparent attempt to
placate a concerned public. The 1970s saw the centralization of federal drug
agencies, including the creation of the Drug Enforcement Agency, and
increased federal prosecution of drug use and trafficking.56 Federal
legislation soon followed suit with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,57
and, later, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,58 which established the
infamous 100-to-I sentencing disparity for crack versus powder cocaine.5 9
State laws were equally harsh. Perhaps the most notorious was the 1973
Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York,o which increased penalties from two
to five years for first-time drug offenders (under the Boggs Act 61) and to
mandatory fifteen years to life sentences for subsequent offenses. 62
2. Racial and Penal Segregation
More than one author has suggested that politicians must have known
that the Wars on Crime and Drugs would have a disparate impact on
African-American communities,63 and some have argued that lawmakers

repeating the same rhetorical mistakes, calling for politicians and reporters to abstain from using
derogatory terms like "ice babies" or "meth babies." Stephen Ornes, What Ever Happened to Crack
Babies?, DISCOVER, Nov. 29, 2006, http://discovermagazine.com/2006/dec/crack-baby-unfoundedstigma. Interestingly, the percentage of whites who use meth is seven times higher than the
percentage of African-Americans. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, METHAMPHETAMINE USE, ABUSE, AND

DEPENDENCE: 2002,2003, AND 2004 (2005), available at http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k5/meth/meth.htm.
56.

WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 40, at 45-51.

57. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-38, 98 Stat. 1987-2040
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2006))
(reducing judicial discretion in sentencing and instituting truth-in-sentencing minimum time
requirements).
58. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
59. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection,47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 128788 (1995). This disparity has subsequently been reduced to 18:1, which is, needless to say, a "half-aloaf compromise." See Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial
Disparities in the American CriminalJustice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 276 (2010) [hereinafter
Tonry, Causes].
60. See 1973 N.Y. Laws 1040-80, 2190-239, 3023-31 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00.65, 221.00-.55 (McKinney 2010)); cf Madison Gray, A Brief History of New York's Rockefeller
DrugLaws, TIME, Apr. 2,2009, http:/www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888864,00.html.
61.

WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 40, at 38.

62. See People v. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (N.Y. 1994) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)
(referring to the Rockefeller Drug Laws as a "draconian sentencing scheme").
63.

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF

COLORBLINDNESS 40-57 (2010); Marc Mauer, Race, Class, and the Development of Criminal
Justice Policy, 21 REV. POL'Y RES. 79, 81 (2004).
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enacted these policies precisely because they would have such a disparate
impact.64 The impact of these measures is largely undebatable. Between
1970 and 2003, the U.S. prison population increased from 200,000 to 1.4
million.65 At 780 per 100,000, U.S. incarceration rates are now "four to five
times higher than Spain, England, and New Zealand" and "seven to ten
times higher than those in most other Western countries." 66 Individual states
have seen similar spikes in imprisonment. Since their enactment in 1973, the
Rockefeller Drug Laws, for example, have increased New York prison
populations by 500%.67
These changes have primarily impacted persons of color. While it had
long been the case that racial and ethnic minorities were more likely to be
arrested, charged, and incarcerated than their white counterparts, these
disparities increased considerably during the late 1980s and 1990s. 6 8
African-Americans constituted about one-third of all state and federal
prisoners in the United States in 1960, but by 1995, they made up
approximately one-half of the prison population. 6 9 Between 1980 and 2006,
the increase in African-American rates of imprisonment was nearly four
times the increase in white rates. 70 Individual states saw similar changes. For
example, while African-Americans and Latinos make up just about one-third
of New York's population, they constitute 94% of those convicted under the
Rockefeller Drug Laws. 7 1 Until its repeal, the federal 100-to-i sentencing
scheme for crack cocaine had a similar effect. In 1992, for example, 92.6%
of those sentenced in the United States under the 100-to-i regime were
African-Americans.72 These numbers are especially troubling because
multiple studies have shown that whites use drugs at higher rates than
African-Americans 73 and sell drugs at roughly equivalent rates. 74

64. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 82 (1995) (attributing racial disparities in the
criminal justice system in part to a "calculated effort foreordained to increase [the] percentage" of
African-Americans in prison). But see WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM 5-6 (1987) (contending that while individual cases show evidence of
discrimination, the system as a whole is not discriminatory).
65.

BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 3 (2006).

66.

TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra note 8, at 122.

67. Ernest Drucker, Commentary: Population Impact of Mass Incarceration Under New
York's Rockefeller DrugLaws: An Analysis of Years ofLife Lost, 79 J. URB. HEALTH 1, 1 (2002).
68.

See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 157-76 (1999).

69.

TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra note 8, at 31-32 fig.2. 1.

70.

Id. at 34.

71.

Drucker, supra note 67, at 3.

72.

United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 786 (E.D. Mo. 1994).

73.

TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra note 8, at 56.
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By 1999, studies showed that an African-American man born in the
1960s had a one-in-five chance of spending at least one year in prison.7 5 For
those who had not completed high school, that number climbed to one in
three.76 In 2002, a full 12% of African-American men in their twenties were
incarcerated, while in 2000, only 1% of white men in their twenties were
incarcerated.78 This means that today, 33% of African-American men in
their twenties are in jail, on probation, or on parole, and 33% of AfricanAmerican baby boys bom in 2001 will spend time behind bars.7 Amazingly,
much of this has happened during a period of falling crime rates,80 with
African-American crime commission rates falling at a faster rate than any
other group.8 1
B. The "Super-Predator"War

The first section of this Part describes the emergence of the
iconographic image of the adolescent "super-predator" as a symbol of
juvenile crime in the United States. It then discusses the concomitant
adoption of punitive juvenile justice policies throughout the country. Next, it
details the ways these policy changes have impacted youth of color.
1. The Coming of the Adolescent "Super-Predator"
It is remarkable that the proponents of the Wars on Crime and Drugs
would turn their sights to adolescents in the early 1990s, especially when
one considers the history and purpose of the U.S. juvenile justice system.
Established at the turn of the twentieth century, this country's juvenile
justice system rested on the prevailing Progressive philosophy that the

74.

Id.

75. Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratificationand Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023, 1030 (2010).
76.

Id.

77. Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class
Inequality in US. Incarceration,69 AM. Soc. REV. 151, 151 (2004).
78. Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, The Race of a Criminal Record: How
IncarcerationColors RacialPerceptions, 57 SOC. PROBS. 92, 94 (2010).
79.

See Tonry, Causes,supra note 59, at 274.

80. Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 235 fig.2 (2007).
81. TONRY, PUNISHING RACE, supra note 8, at 29 (noting that African-American participation
in violent crime has fallen proportionately more than other populations).
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system should treat, rather than punish, child offenders.82 In the case of
children, the belief was that delinquent acts were not borne of malevolence,
but rather were a product of social forces largely beyond the children's
control. The Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he child was to be 'treated'
and 'rehabilitated,' and the 'procedures,' from apprehension through
institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive."83
The U.S. juvenile justice system has experienced shifts in penal
philosophy over time. During the first half of the twentieth century, a belief
in rehabilitation and individualized treatment gave way to concern over the
indeterminate nature of dispositions. 84 Juvenile offenders often received the
"worst of both worlds . .. neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children," the
Supreme Court lamented in 1966.85 In response, the Court imported a series
of key constitutional safeguards from the adult system during the 1960s and
1970s, 86 including the rights to notice, to counsel, to confront and crossexamine witnesses, to a fair and impartial hearing, and to protections against
self-incrimination.87 With these changes, however, came increased formality
and an ideological shift in focus from the "best interests" of the offender to
the gravity of the offense itself.88
Nonetheless, few anticipated the changes of the 1990s. While the push
for more punitive juvenile justice policies had already begun in the late
1980s as members of both parties witnessed the political benefits of getting
"tough on crime," a few high-profile incidents aided these efforts. The most
notable of these was the infamous "Central Park Jogger" case. In April 1989,

82. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 69194 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court] (noting that the emerging
perception of children "as vulnerable, innocent, passive, and dependent beings who needed extended
preparation for life" at the turn of the century reflected a shift from the pre-industrial view of
children as miniature adults).
83.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).

84. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967) ("In theory the [juvenile] court's

operations could justifiably be informal, its findings and decisions made without observing ordinary
procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest of the child.. .. In fact it
frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process of lawknowing not what else to do and needing, whether admittedly or not, to act in the community's
interest even more imperatively than the child's.").
85.

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).

86. In 1967, for example, the Court held that the constitutional rights to notice, to counsel, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, to a fair and impartial hearing, and to protections against selfincrimination all applied equally in juvenile court. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-58.
87.

Id. at 33-34, 41, 55, 57.

See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
88.
COURT 162-65 (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS].
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a young, white female jogger was brutally beaten, raped, and left to die in
Manhattan's Central Park.89 Within hours, police arrested and charged a
group of seven African-American and Latino teens ranging in age from
fourteen to sixteen with rape, assault, and attempted murder. 90 Almost
immediately, a new term was coined: the incident was part of a new
adolescent practice known as "wilding."9 1 Local politicians seized on the
incident. In the summer of 1989, New York City Mayor Edward Koch called
for the death penalty for "wilding," deemed the seven suspects "'monsters,"'
and complained that the juvenile justice system was too lenient. 92 A similar
response came from mayoral candidate David Dinkins, who responded with
a call for a "new 'antiwilding law.' 93
As crime rates continued to climb in the early 1990s,94 the calls for
stiffer penalties for juvenile offenders reached a fever pitch. Unlike the Wars
on Crime and Drugs, however, there was no executive clarion call to arms.
The closest thing to a declaration came in the form of a 1995 magazine
article. In The Coming of the Super-Predators,former Princeton University

political science professor John Dilulio warned of an oncoming tsunami of
adolescent "super-predators," "morally-impoverished" youth who had grown
up "surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in abusive,

89. David E. Pitt, Jogger'sAttackers Terrorizedat Least 9 in 2 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/22/nyregion/jogger-s-attackers-terrorized-at-least-9-in-2hours.html.
90.
Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions-Lessons of the Central ParkJogger
Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 209, 220 (2006); Pitt, supra note 89. Notably, thirteen
years later, a convicted rapist named Matias Reyes confessed to the crime, and the five juveniles'
convictions were vacated. Davies, supra.
91. Pitt, supra note 89. New York Times journalist David Pitt was told the term from a New
York City detective who heard the term from the suspected schoolboys, writing:
The youths who raped and savagely beat a young investment banker as she jogged
in Central Park Wednesday night were part of a loosely organized gang of 32
schoolboys whose random, motiveless assaults terrorized at least eight other people
over nearly two hours, senior police investigators said yesterday.
Chief of Detectives Robert Colangelo, who said the attacks appeared unrelated to
money, race, drugs or alcohol, said that some of the 20 youths brought in for
questioning had told investigators that the crime spree was the product of a pastime
called "wilding."
Id.
92.
Lynell Hancock, Wolf Pack: The Press and the Central Park Jogger, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. 39 (2003) ("Mayor Ed Koch was often quoted calling the arrested boys
'monsters' and complaining that juvenile laws were too soft."); Michael Welch et al., Moral Panic
over Youth Violence: Wilding and the Manufacture of Menace in the Media, 34 YOUTH & Soc'Y 3,
10(2002).
93.

Welch et al., supra note 92, at 9-10.

94. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 88, at 201 (noting that the juvenile arrest rate for all
violent crimes increased 67.3% between 1986 and 1995).
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violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings."95 These were
"kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and no sense of the
future . . . . 'stone-cold predators."' 96 One year later, Dilulio projected that
"by the year 2010 there [would be] approximately 270,000 more juvenile
super-predators on the streets than there were in 1990."97 In My Black Crime
Problem, and Ours, Professor Dilulio predicted that "the black crime rate,
both black-on-black and black-on-white, is increasing, so that as many as
half of these juvenile super-predators could be young black males." 98
The news media ran with this narrative. In a headline announcing that
the "super-predators" have arrived, Newsweek asked, "Should We Cage the
New Breed of Vicious Kids?" 99 Borrowing rhetoric from the Wars on Crime
and Drugs, the theme of "moral depravity" again played a central role. "Kids
Without a Conscience?" asked the cover of People magazine in June
1997.100 The style of news reporting that dominated the era only reinforced
the message. In its coverage of juvenile offending, news media often relied
on a technique called episodic framing. 01 Instead of placing an individual
incident in its broader statistical, political, or socioeconomic context, the

95.

Dilulio, supra note 2, at 25-26.

96.

Id. at 23-24.

97.
JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., MANHATrAN INST., How To STOP THE COMING CRIME WAVE 1
(1996); see also WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY ... AND How To
WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996) (charting the projected increase in the

U.S. juvenile population between 1990 and 2010).
98. John J. Dilulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, 6 CITY J. 19 (1996), available at
http://www.city-joumal.org/html/6_2_myblack.html.
99. Peter Annin, "Superpredators"Arrive: Should We Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids?,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57. Other cover stories from our nation's most popular news
magazines were similar in tone: Big Shots: An Inside Look at the Deadly Love Affair Between
America's Kids and Their Guns, TIME, Aug. 2, 1993; Kids and Guns: A Report from America's
Classroom Killing Grounds, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992; Teen Violence: Wild in the Streets,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1993; Teenage Time Bombs: Violent Juvenile Crime Is Soaring-andIt Is
Going to Get Worse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 25, 1996; and When Killers Come to Class:
Even Suburban Parents Now Fearthe Rising Tide of Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 8,
1993. See Robert E. Shephard, How the Media MisrepresentsJuvenile Policies, 12 CRIM. JUST. 37,
38 (1998) (listing cover stories in national magazines that have "heightened the emphasis on youth
crime").
100. PEOPLE WKLY., June 23, 1997, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/issue/
0,,7566970623,00.html.
101. See What's the Matter with Kids Today?: Images of Teenagers on Local and National TV
News, MEDIA MONITOR (Ctr. for Media and Pub. Affairs, Washington, D.C.) Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 12, available at http://www.cmpa.com/files/media monitor/00sepoct.pdf; CHILDREN NOW, THE
LOCAL TELEVISION NEWS MEDIA'S PICTURE OF CHILDREN 5, 16 (2000), available at http://www.

childrennow.org/uploads/documents/local-television 2001.pdf (referencing studies that
episodic framing was frequently used in reporting children's news stories during the 1990s).

show
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news media frequently reported juvenile offenses as discrete events,' 02
which, social scientists claim, encourages viewers to associate the conduct in
question with the moral deficiency of the individual, rather than her broader
social milieu.'o3 When the topic is crime, episodic framing galvanizes
support for more punitive crime policies.'
By all indications, the American public was listening. Even as national
crime rates were dropping steadily, a flurry of public opinion polls
conducted in the late 1990s revealed the American public's fear of violent
juvenile offenders.' 0 5 Polls also revealed that the public substantially
overestimated the likelihood of being victimized by a person of color.
Nearly twice as many respondents to a 1994 poll, for example, believed that
they were more likely to be victimized by a perpetrator of color than a white
7
perpetrator' 0 6 when, in reality, the vast majority of crimes are intra-racial. 0

102. See CHILDREN NOW, supra note 101 (finding that 81% of stories featured on locally
produced evening news programs on the three major networks in six American cities between July I
and July 31, 2000 "made no connection between discrete events (e.g. criminal incidents) and broader
trends or themes (e.g. U.S. poverty rates or after school programs)"); LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT
SCHIRALDI, BLDG. BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE NEWS 7, 12

(2001), availableat http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/01 -04_REP OffBalanceNews JJRD.pdf ("Studies spanning almost 100 years-1910 to 2000-are consistent in their findings that
news reports describe what happened with little reporting about why the crime and violence
happened or what could be done about it.").
103.

See, e.g., ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREw ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE

MIND: MEDIA AND RACE INAMERICA 49 (2001) (arguing that framing an incident, such as a driveby shooting, as a "gang war story," may obscure "other possible mental associations" and may
"make... more sympathetic connections less available to the audience"). See generally SHANTO
IYENGAR, IS ANYONE

RESPONSIBLE?: How TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES 5 (1991)

(asserting that because framing focuses on "specific episodes, individual perpetrators, victims, or
other actors at the expense of more general, thematic information," viewers are less likely to
attribute responsibility to societal factors). For a broader discussion of the role of the media in
influencing crime policy and criminal justice decision-making, see Beale, supra note 29, at 400-05
and Perry L. Moriearty, FramingJustice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV.
849 (2010).
104. See, e.g., Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibilityfor PoliticalIssues, 546 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 59. 64-65 (1996) (noting that 36% of participants surveyed after viewing an
experimental episodic news story assigned individualistic rather than societal responsibility to the
perpetrator of the crime and 60% called for more punitive crime policies); cf Paul M. Kellstedt,
Media Framing and the Dynamics of Racial Policy Preferences, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 249-50
(2000) (noting that media coverage of race frequently shifts between emphasizing one of two core
American values, individualism and egalitarianism, and arguing that when media coverage
disproportionately emphasizes the value of individualism, the public is more likely to express
conservative policy preferences).
105. For example, even though juvenile homicides declined 68% between 1993 and 1999, 62%
of respondents in one 1999 poll believed that juvenile crime rates were increasing. See MARK
SOLER, BLDG. BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, PUBLIC OPINION ON YOUTH, CRIME AND RACE: A GUIDE FOR

ADVOCATES 5 (2001), availableat http://www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/advocacyguide.pdf.
106. See, e.g., Walter L. Updegrave, As Grim Crime Scenes Fill Our Newscasts and
Nightmares, Americans Feel More Threatened by Violence Than Ever. But the Surprising Truthfor
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Public opinion polls also revealed a concern that America's youth had
lost their moral compasses. A 2001 report that the Frameworks Institute
published, which compiled information from dozens of surveys on
perceptions of youth, was particularly illuminating. Among the findings the
study reported were the following: in response to a 1998 survey, only 16%
of Americans said that "'young people under the age of 30 share[d] most of
their moral and ethical values."'"08 In a separate 1998 poll, when asked what
comes to mind when they think of teens, nearly three-quarters of
respondents gave negative descriptions, such as "'rude,' 'wild,' or
'irresponsible."'l 09 Eighty-two percent of adults who responded to a 1998
poll felt that youth "[did] not have a strong sense of right and wrong," up
from 46% in 1965 and 34% in 1952.110 Not surprisingly, respondents
overwhelmingly endorsed punitive responses to juvenile offending.1 1
Ostensibly to ameliorate these concerns, lawmakers responded.
Between 1992 and 1997 alone, legislatures in forty-five states enacted or
enhanced waiver laws that made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders to the
criminal justice system. Thirty-one states gave both juvenile and criminal
courts expanded sentencing authority over juvenile offenders, forty-seven
states enacted laws that modified or removed traditional juvenile court
confidentiality provisions by making records and proceedings more open,
and twenty-two states expanded the role of juvenile crime victims in the

Most People Is That .. . You're Safer Than You Think, CNN MONEY, June 1, 1994, at 114, available
at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag archive/1994/06/01/88911/index.htm
(reporting that "49% of Americans believe that whites are preyed on more often by nonwhite
criminals .. . rather than by other whites (26%)").
107. See id. ("[O]f the 5.1 million violent crimes with white victims in 1992, the perpetrator
was white 66% of the time and black only 21%."); see also CALLIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE, 1993-98, at 10 (2001),

available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvr98.pdf ("Sixty-six percent of white victims
and 76% of black victims were victimized by an offender of the same race, 1993-98 . . . .").
108. MEG BOSTROM, FRAMEWORKS INST., THE 21ST CENTURY TEEN: PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND
TEEN REALITY 4, 33 (2001), available at http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/youth
publicperceptions.pdf (citing WASH. POST ET AL., AMERICAN VALUES: 1998 NATIONAL SURVEY
OF AMERICANS ON VALUES 3 (1998), availableat http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/loader.cfm?url=/
commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=I 4655).
109. Id. at 4 (summarizing two national telephone polls conducted between December I and 8,
1998, one of 1005 adults, including 384 parents of children under eighteen and another of 328
teenagers (citing PUBLIC AGENDA, KIDS THESE DAYS '99, at 3, 10 (1999), available at http://www.
publicagenda.org/files/pdf/kids-thesedays_99.pdf)).
110. Id. at 6, 33 n. 11-13 (citing the Shell Poll by Hart Research, a national poll of 1277 adults
conducted between March 16-20, 1999; a national Gallop Poll of 2783 adults conducted in
November 1965; and a national poll conducted by Ben Gaffin and Associates that published the
results of 2987 personal interviews of adults conducted in June and July of 1952).
111. Id. at 31-32, 38 n.132 (citing a national poll of 1005 adults published by the Public Policy
Research Institute conducted from June 6-26, 1995).
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juvenile justice process.' 12 California's Proposition 21 is among the harshest
of these laws. Proposition 21 requires adult trials for juveniles as young as
fourteen years of age if they have been charged with a list of enumerated
felonies. It also transfers absolute discretion from judges to prosecutors to
determine which juveniles should be tried as adults, weakens confidentiality
laws, toughens gang laws, and expands California's three-strikes law for
both juveniles and adults."' Ironically, voters ratified the referendum in
2000, a time when arrest rates among juveniles were hitting their lowest
point in thirty years.114
The net effect of these laws was astounding. Between 1985 and 1994,
the number of delinquency cases waived to criminal court climbed 83%,
from 7200 to 13,200.115 In 1988, approximately 1600 juvenile offenders
were confined in adult jails; by 1997, there were more than 9000.116 By
some estimates, nearly 2000 juvenile offenders in adult jails were serving
sentences of life without the possibility of parole.1 17 To put this in
perspective, no other country in the Western world sends juveniles to prison
for life, and by 2005, every country except the United States and Somalia
had ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which explicitly
forbids "life imprisonment without possibility of release" for "offenses
committed by persons below eighteen years of age." 18
In the late 1990s, Congress jumped into the fray. In 1997, the Senate
Judiciary Committee took up the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act
of 1997,"9 which proposed multiple "get tough" measures for juvenile
offenders, including a provision that lowered the minimum age for trial of

112. See HOwARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006

NATIONAL REPORT 43,96-97 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/
nr2006.pdf.
113.

See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(d) (West 2010).

114. THE NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, OJJDP STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK (Oct. 31,
2009), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR Display.asp?ID=qa05200 (follow
"Excel" hyperlink "Juvenile Arrest Rates for All Crimes 1980-2008 statistical spreadsheet" for data).
115.

SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 112, at 186.

116. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS
AND JAILS, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 5 tbl.2 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/loj
a/182503.pdf.
117. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD
OFFENDERS INTHE UNITED STATES 2 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11578/
section/2.
118.

Id.

119. See S. 10, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999), available at http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS105sl0is/PDF/BILLS-I05sl0is.pdf.
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capital offenses from eighteen to sixteen.120 Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the
Act's sponsors, explained that "'[p]eople are expecting us to do something
about these violent teenagers. We've got to move on this."'l 2 1 Although it
was never put to a vote in 1997,122 the Act resurfaced in 1999 after the
shootings at Columbine High School. The proposed Consequences for
Juvenile Offenders Act of 1999 again included multiple measures to make it
easier for prosecutors to try children as adults.123 Although it subsequently
died in conference, the Act failed only because of an attached provision that
strengthened firearm control laws.1 24 Ironically, while Congress was
prepared to exact harsh punishments on juveniles in the name of public
safety, it was not willing to adopt laws that would keep firearms out of their
hands.
2. Disproportionate Minority Contact
These so-called "get tough" laws of the 1990s had by far the harshest
impact on youth of color. While social scientists had known for decades that
adolescents of color were more likely to be arrested, detained, formally
charged in juvenile court, transferred to adult court, and confined to secure
residential facilities than their white counterparts,' 25 these disparities soared
during the 1980s and 1990s.' 26 Statistics suggest that four out of five youth

120.

Id. § 103.

VINCENT SCHIRALDI & MARK SOLER, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE?
121.
THE PUBLIC'S OPINION OF THE VIOLENT AND REPEAT JUVENILE OFFENDER ACT OF 1997, at 591

(1998) (citing New Juvenile Crime Bill, in BULL. FRONT-RUNNER, (July 14, 1997)), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/98-03 rep willofthepeople jj.pdf).
122. See Tara Kole, Note, Juvenile Offenders, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 231, 235-36 (2001)
(describing the Act as an "unsuccessful attempt[] by Congress [to enact legislation] to address the
perceived rise in juvenile crime").
123.

H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).

124.

JoAnne O'Bryant et al., Juvenile Justice: Legislative Activity and Funding Trends for

Selected Programs, in JUVENILE CRIME: CURRENT ISSUES AND BACKGROUND 140, 142 (Lawrence

V. Moore ed., 2003); see also Michael Grunwald, Culture Wars Erupt in Debate on Hill, WASH.
POST, June 18, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/june99/violencel8.htm
(discussing the contentious issues surrounding the Act).
125. In fact, the problem of racial disparities in the juvenile justice system is so long-standing,
wide-spread, and entrenched that it has earned its own acronym-Disproportionate Minority Contact
or "DMC." See POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 7, at 1-3 (2007); see also CARL E. POPE ET
AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM

1989 THROUGH 2001, at 10 n.1 (2002); Michael J. Leiber, DisproportionateMinority Confinement
(DMC) of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, 48 CRIME &
DELINQ. 3, 11-14, app.D (2002).
126.

HINTON HoYTT ET AL., supra note 5, at 10.
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newly held in detention between 1983 and 1997 were juveniles of color.12 7
The transfer of juveniles of color to adult court was equally, if not more,
disproportionate. A 2000 study, for example, showed that 82% of youth
charged in adult court in eighteen of the largest jurisdictions in the country
were youth of color and that African-American (43%) and Latino (37%)
youth were more likely than white youth (26%) to receive a sentence of
incarceration.' 28 These numbers persist even today.129
Research suggests that these disparities cannot be attributed entirely to
crime commission rates. While differential offending contributes to
disproportionality, research shows that the statistical differences between the
offending patterns of white youth and minority youth are simply not great
enough to account for the racial disparities observed at any of the processing
points in the juvenile justice system. 13 0 To date, of the hundreds of multiple
regression studies that have been conducted on disparities in juvenile justice,
nearly two-thirds have documented a "race effect" on decision-making,
which suggests that race-neutral criteria cannot, by themselves, account for
the disparities observed in processing outcomes.' 31 In other words, but for

127.

Id

128.

JUSZKIEWICZ, supranote 5, at 10.

129. Recent research by the Department of Justice has continued to confirm that minorities
fared worse than whites at every stage of the juvenile justice process nationally and that the effects
were cumulative. C. PUZZANCHERA & B. ADAMS, NATIONAL DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY

CONTACT DATABOOK (2008), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/asp/display.asp?
year-2005&offense-1 &displaytype-rri. Specifically, in 2005, minority youth were 1.7 times as
likely to be arrested, 1.1 times as likely to be waived to adult court, 0.9 times as likely to be
adjudicated delinquent, and 1.2 times as likely to be placed in a secure facility as white youth. Id.
130. HINTON HoYTr ET AL., supra note 5, at 21. While it is true that African-American youth
commit "slightly more violent crime" than white youth, they commit "about the same amount of
property crime, and less drug crime than white youth," and "[i]n no category can the marginal
differences in white and African-American behavior explain the huge disparity in arrest or
incarceration rates." Id. at 19. African-American youth are arrested at twice the rate of white youth
for drug offenses and 2.5 times the rate of white youth for weapons offenses, even though white
youth report substantially higher levels of drug use and commission of weapons crimes. Id at 20-21.
131. To date, five comprehensive reviews of the literature demonstrate that legal and extralegal
factors alone are unable to account for race differentials in contact with the juvenile justice system.
See Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Processing, in OUR
CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN JUVENILE

JUSTICE 23 (Damell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) (providing empirical
demonstration of racial disparities in juvenile justice); POPE ET AL., supra note 125, at 2 (reviewing
studies from March 1989 to December 2001); CARL E. POPE & WILLIAM FEYERHERM, OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MINORITIES IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: RESEARCH SUMMARY (1995) (confirming the overrepresentation of
minorities in the juvenile justice system); Rodney L. Engen et al., Racial Disparities in the

Punishment of Youth: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of the Literature, 49 SOC. PROBS.
194, 195 (2002) ("review[ing] theoretical perspectives on racial disparity [and] highlighting the
central predictions of each perspective"); Leiber, supra note 125, at 3-4 (identifying "the extent of
minority overrepresentation in states' juvenile justice systems and assessment of the causes of
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the presence of race bias, overrepresentation would not exist to the same
degree.
III. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL WAR

What accounts for the "race effects" observed in these studies? And,
more generally, why is it that we, as a nation, have continued to enact laws
and policies that have devastated such a large segment of our adolescent
population? In part, we can blame the "social psychology of social war."
This Part summarizes a wealth of contemporary research that shows that
humans react to, interpret, and make decisions about the environment, and
each other, largely from a series of unconscious cognitive associations and
dissociations. When stimulated or "primed," these processes are automatic;
they happen whether we want them to or not. 132 Importantly, several studies
conducted over the last decade suggest that the political posturing, media
imagery, war rhetoric, and Manichean moralizing associated with the
"super-predator" war, and with American social wars in general, have an
especially potent effect on this dynamic.133 These images and ideas influence
not only the content of our stereotypes of the enemy, but also the degree to
which we rely on those stereotypes. 13 4 Ultimately, they also influence our
willingness to embrace measures that punish and incapacitate the enemy. 135
A. Social Cognition Theory

Most research suggests that overt racism and conscious discrimination
have declined steadily since the 1960s. 136 What persists, however, are
unconscious racial stereotypes that are less visible but no less pernicious.13 1
To better understand how unconscious bias works, a brief primer on social
cognition theory is warranted.

DMC"); see also Carl E. Pope & Michael J. Leiber, DisproportionateMinority Confinement/Contact
(DMC): The Federal Initiative, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN, supra, at 51 (providing "a
historical overview of the activities employed to address disproportionate minority youth
confinement/contact").
132.

See infra Part III.A.

133.

See infra Part III.B.

134.

Id.

135.

Id.

136. See generally HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (1997).
137. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO
CULTURE 35-36 (2007) (questioning whether "conscious will is an illusion created by people

thinking about an action before performing it").
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In an effort to cope with what would otherwise be an overwhelming
environment, humans unconsciously engage in a series of complex cognitive
processes that enable us to parse and react quickly to incoming
information.' 38 When we receive external stimuli, we selectively "map" the
information into established categories.1 39 For example, when we encounter
another human being, we might map our perceptions into categories such as
age, gender, race, or sexual orientation.140 The categorization of these
perceptions activates cognitive structures called "schemas,"l 4 ' and from the
information or "meanings" embedded in our schemas, we draw inferences
and make predictions about the person.' 42 These meanings may include both
cognitive beliefs (stereotypes) and affective feelings (prejudices) about the
groups with which we associate the person.143 According to psychologists,
our respective categories and schemas influence every aspect of our
cognition-what information we receive, how that information is classified,
how we react to it, and how we remember it.144 More often than not, these
cognitive processes are automatic; they happen almost instantaneously and
whether we want them to or not.145
Research shows that we develop "racial" meanings, beliefs, and
feelings about members of other racial groups, from both direct and
vicarious experiences. Our direct experiences with racial others are generally
more influential, but our vicarious experiences may be more numerous. 146

138.

Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499 (2005).

139.

Id. at 1498-99.

140. Id. at 1499 n.47 (citing Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice,and Discrimination, in 2
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 376 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)).
141. A "schema" is a cognitive framework or concept that helps organize and interpret
information. See generally FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 98.
142.

Kang, supra note 138, at 1498-99.

143.

Id. at 1500.

144. Id. at 1493 (defining "racial mechanics" as "the ways in which race alters intrapersonal,
interpersonal, and intergroup interactions" (citing Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130,
1138-46 (2000)).
145. Psychologists believe that human beings think, make decisions, and react to other people
along a continuum of modes that range from purely automatic, at one extreme, to controlled, at the
other. See Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years Later, in DUAL-PROCESS
THEORIES INSOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231, 231-42, 249 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)
(noting citations in the social-scientific literature to "the continuum model," which posits a
continuum between automatic and cognitive processes to account for the range of ways that people
form impressions of others). When we react automatically, our thought processes are unintentional
and unconscious. See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 231-33
(1996) (discussing theoretical and empirical models in support of an "automaticity" hypothesis).
146.

Jerry Kang defines "vicarious experiences" as "stories of or simulated engagements with
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Vicarious experiences may include films, music, the internet, television
shows, newspapers, or political speeches that in some way depict, describe,
or report on members of different racial groups.14 7 Whites, who by and large
live in homogenous communities, are especially likely to rely upon vicarious
experiences when evaluating racial others.148
In many cases, however, the material presented through our vicarious
experiences is imbalanced in some way. This is particularly true when it
comes to crime news reporting. Over the last two decades, multiple studies
have demonstrated that people of color, and African-Americans in particular,
are overrepresented as perpetrators and underrepresented as victims of crime
in the media. A well-known study of local news programming in Los
Angeles during the mid-1990s, for example, found that the media was 22%
more likely to show African-Americans committing violent crime than
nonviolent crime, while, in reality, they were equally likely to be arrested for
both violent crime and nonviolent crime.149 White Americans, on the other
hand, were 31% more likely to be depicted committing a nonviolent crime
than a violent crime, when, in fact, they were just 7% more likely to be
arrested for a nonviolent crime. 150 Studies have also shown that the news
media over-represents the incidence of interracial crime.' 5' Not surprisingly,
when vicarious experiences with racial others are imbalanced, the racial
meanings in our schemas become imbalanced.152
Until recently, the challenge has been to gauge the content of an
individual person's racial schemas. Because most of us are unwilling to
admit to or are unaware that we possess racial stereotypes and prejudices,'53
self-reported attitudes are not helpful. Instead, social psychologists have
begun to develop indirect ways to measure racial meanings. The most recent
racial others provided through various forms of the media or narrated by parents and our peers."
Kang, supra note 138, at 1539. In a society as racially segregated as ours, Professors Robert
Entman and Andrew Rojecki note that "Whites depend heavily on cultural material, especially
media images for cataloging" racial others. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supranote 103, at 49; see also
Kang, supra note 138, at 1539 n.258.
147.

See Kang, supranote 138, at 1540.

148.

ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 103.

149. Frank Gilliam et al., Crime in Black and White: The Violent, Scary World ofLocal News, 1
HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POL. 6, 13 fig.4 (1996).
150.

Id.

151. See, e.g., Susan B. Sorenson et al., News Media Coverage and the Epidemiology of
Homicide, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1510, 1512 (1998). For example, between 1990 and 1994, the
Los Angeles Times was 25% more likely to report interethnic homicides than intraethnic homicides
in Los Angeles. Id.
152.

Kang, supra note 138, at 1540.

153. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processesin Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181, 181 (2001).
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phase of this research has sought to take advantage of the automaticity of
bias through what are called reaction-time studies. Scientists trigger
automatic cognitive processes through subliminal exposure to external
stimuli, a technique known as "priming," which activates a subject's racial
schema without triggering conscious awareness of either the prime or its
impact.15 4 Subjects are then asked to perform a task.' 5 When the prime and
the task are consistent with the subject's schema, the subject's response time
is faster; when they are inconsistent, it is slower.' 56 The time differentials
observed are viewed as measurements of an individual's "implicit bias."'
A series of studies researchers at the University of Chicago conducted
over the last decade are illustrative. In these experiments, researchers asked
subjects to distinguish between computerized images of guns and hand
tools.' 8 Just before each object appeared, a human face appeared on the
screen. 5 9 In some instances, the face was black; in others, it was white.bO
There were two versions of the experiment.161 In one, participants were
allowed to respond to the objects at their own pace.16 2 In the other, they had
to respond to each object within half a second.163 The results were troubling.
In the self-paced version, participants detected guns faster in the presence of
a black face, and in the split-second version, participants falsely identified
guns more often when the face was black than when it was white.1 64
Researchers concluded that participants' response time was faster because
the black face "prime" condition and the gun were consistent with subjects'
existing racial schemas and drew upon their stereotypes about blacks and
gun possession. 65 Perhaps more notable was the fact that, when forced to
make a snap judgment, the subjects' stereotypic association between race

154.

Kang, supra note 138, at 1505 n.72 (citations omitted).

155.

Id.at 1508-09.

156. Id. at 1510 ("Tasks in the schema-consistent arrangement should be easier, and so it is for
most of us. How much easier .. . provides a measure of implicit bias.").
157.

Id. at 1509.

158.

See Payne, supra note 153.

159.

Id at 183-84.

160.

Id. at 184.

161.

Id. at 181.

162.

Id.

163.

Id.at 188.

164.

Payne, supra note 153, at 189-90.

165.

See id
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and violence caused them to misperceive weapons where there were none.166
Studies like this one have evolved into an entire industry devoted to
measuring implicit bias and a prototype called the Implicit Association Test
(IAT).167 Not surprisingly, the IAT, along with a host of other tests, has
repeatedly documented varying degrees of implicit bias against AfricanAmericans, Latinos, Asians, and non-Americans.' 6 ' This implicit bias, in
turn, has had demonstrable effects on performance, judgment, and treatment
of others. 169 Significantly, recent studies have documented implicit bias not
just among members of the general public, but also among police officers,
probation officers, prosecutors, capital defense attorneys, and federal
magistrate judges who help to administer our justice system. 0
B. Cognitive Warfare

These cognitive processes are especially susceptible to several features
of American social wars. First, actors in social wars constantly rely on
negative portrayals of the enemy. Researchers link this reliance to the
formation of and frequent reliance upon negative stereotypes. Second, this
strategic employment of war rhetoric increases aggression and hostility
toward social "out-groups." Finally, social wars promote a Manichean
mindset, a "good versus evil" diametric, which increases support for harsher
punishment.
By all accounts, the politics, rhetoric, and imagery endemic to the

166.

Id. at 188-90.

167. The Implicit Association Test, which tests associations between categories, such as
"[wihite," and attributes, such as "smart," is now available electronically through Harvard
University's Project Implicit website. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
168. Kang, supra note 138, at 1512 (citing Nilanjana Dasgupt, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism,
Outgroup Favoritism,and Their BehavioralManifestations, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 143, 147 (2004)).
169.

Id. at 1514-35; see also supranote 10.

170. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1590-91 (2006) (arguing that prosecutors exhibit
cognitive bias); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004) (finding that capital defense attorneys
exhibit the same levels of implicit bias as the rest of the population); Sandra Graham & Brian S.
Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 483, 487 (2004) (documenting the impact of written racial cues on police officers' and
juvenile probation officers' judgments about the "culpability, expected recidivism, and deserved
punishment" of hypothetical offenders); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (reporting on a study of 167 federal magistrate judges, which revealed that
they are susceptible to heuristics and biases when making decisions); Michael J. Leiber & Kristan C.
Fox, Race and the Impact of Detention on Juvenile Justice Decision Making, 51 CRIME & DELINQ.
470, 489-90 (2005) (attributing observed negative race effects in outcomes to "racial stereotyping of
African-Americans as delinquent, prone to drug offenses, dangerous, and unsuitable for treatment").
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"super-predator" war was extreme in its demonization and adultification of
adolescent offenders. Professors Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg
deemed the 1980s and 1990s an era of "moral panic" about juvenile crime,
marked by an exaggeration of the threat adolescent offenders posed and
collective hostility toward this group.1 ' Politicians and the media were both
complicit. As Part II detailed, network and cable television stories portraying
adolescent "gang-bangers," magazine covers lamenting the moral
deterioration of America's youth, and politicians trumpeting laws like
Proposition 21 and the federal Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act
created a veritable onslaught of information that both implicitly and
explicitly linked adolescents, and African-American adolescents in
particular, with violent crime. 72
One study from the height of the "super-predator" frenzy shows the
impact of these influences particularly well. In 1998, political scientists
Frank Gilliam and Shanto lyengar designed an experiment to test the impact
of a "crime news script." 7 They created four separate versions of a
fictitious local newscast that contained a short crime segment in the
middle.' 74 Before the more than two thousand participants saw the
videotape, the researchers asked them to complete a short questionnaire
soliciting information about their economic and social backgrounds, their
political beliefs, and their customary media habits.175 They were then
divided into four groups.'7 6 Some participants watched a story in which the
alleged perpetrator of a murder was an African-American male.'77 Other
subjects were given the same news report, but featuring a white male as the
murder suspect.'7 8 A third group of participants watched the news report

171.

See ELIZABETH S. ScoTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 109-

12 (2008) (arguing that juvenile gang members were at the center of a moral panic during the 1990s
that produced draconian laws such as California's Proposition 21); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 807 (2003) (arguing that the punitive trend in
juvenile justice policy has elements of "moral panic, in which the media, politicians, and the public
reinforce each other in an escalating pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social threat"). The
term "availability heuristic" describes the phenomenon through which collective perceptions of risk
become magnified and reinforced by vivid images of crime and crime victims. See, e.g., Daniel
Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (Daniel Kahnemann et al. eds., 1982).
172.

See supra Part II.

173. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto lyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCL 560, 561 (2000).
174.

Id. at 563.

175.

Id. at 564.

176.

Id. at 563.

177.

Id.

178.

Id.

The Journalof Gender, Race & Justice

308

[ 15:2012]

edited to exclude information concerning the identity of the perpetrator. 179 A
fourth control group saw no crime news story at all. 80 The participants were
then asked to complete a second, longer questionnaire that probed their
attitudes toward crime and punishment.'
The results were astonishing. More than 60% of those who watched the
crime report with no reference to a perpetrator falsely recalled seeing one,
and of those, 70% identified the perpetrator as African-American.' 8 2 White
participants who saw the version with the African-American suspect
exhibited an increased tendency to attribute crime to individual failings and
increased negative attitudes toward African-Americans that exceeded the
increases observed in those who saw the version with the white suspect.8 3
They also exhibited a statistically significant 6% increase in levels of
support for punitive crime policies and more than a 10% increase in levels of
what Gilliam and lyengar referred to as "new," "hidden," or "covert"
racism.184
Second, and perhaps more obvious, is the influence of cognitive
processes on "war" rhetoric, which implicitly casts the target as "unAmerican" and exacerbates in-group/out-group hostility. Because war is
generally associated with inter-national conflict, it naturally evokes concepts
of national identity.185 In doing so, war rhetoric subtly tends to conflate the
proposed in-group with Americanism and implicitly portrays the proposed
out-group as un-American. 18 6 This is particularly important in light of
implicit bias research that suggests that Americans of color, including
African-Americans, are less easily associated with "American" than are
European-Americans.187 Exposure to nationalistic symbols has also been
found to influence levels of aggression and hostility. In one recent study,
researchers subliminally exposed participants to images of the American
flag. 8 They were then asked to complete word fragments.189 Those primed

179.

Gilliam & lyengar, supra note 173, at 563.

180.

Id

181.

Id. at 564-65.

182.

Id at 564.

183.

Id. at 567-70.

184.

Id. at 566-69.

185. David Ryan, Framing September 11: Rhetorical Device and Photographic Opinion, 23
EUR. J. AM. CULTURE 5, 7 (2004).
186.

Id.

187. Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American=White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 447, 466 (2005).
188.

Melissa J. Ferguson & Ran R. Hassin, On the Automatic Association Between America and
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with the flag completed the fragments more often with aggression- and warrelated words than those who were not exposed.190 They also were more
prone to display hostile behavior in response to a mild computer-based
provocation.'91 Interestingly, researchers observed these effects only for
those participants who were exposed to high levels of national news.' 92
Although research has not yet been done on social "war" rhetoric, race, and
the punishment of adolescent offenders, the implications are obvious.
Perhaps the most unique effect of social wars is their ability to moralize
issues. Once war is declared, the target changes from a problem in search of
a solution to a question of moral superiority between two positions.193
Consider the title of one of the most controversial texts of the 1990s: Body
Count: Moral Poverty ... And How To Win America's War Against Crime

and Drugs.194 Under Body Count's formulation, drug addiction is not an
affliction, but a moral choice.195 By framing the conduct of the proposed
out-group as an attack on the moral fiber of society, the proposed in-group
can claim moral superiority in the form of self-defense, and immorality is
imputed on the out-group as the aggressor. 196 The result is a classic
Manichean worldview-good waging war against evil. It follows then that a
group that views itself as morally superior to another group is more willing
to engage in violent or punitive acts against that group.' 97
What is more surprising is the fact that this moral diametric affects not
just those who evaluate a targeted cohort from a distance, the everyday
consumer of the nightly news, for example, but also those whose job it is to
decide how harshly to punish individual members of that cohort. Two
studies of decision-making by juvenile justice practitioners bear this out.
They also poignantly illustrate how race seems to inform judgments about an
individual's relative morality.
In 1999, in an attempt to determine why African-American youth in
Aggressionfor News Watchers, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1632, 1635, 1647 (2007).
189.

Id. at 1637.

190.

Id. at 1637-38.

191.

Id. at 1640-42.

192.

Id. at 1642-43.

193.

See Mark E. Brandon, War and American ConstitutionalOrder, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1815,

1824-26 (2003).
194.

BENNETT ET AL., supra note 97.

195.

See id.

196.

See Brandon, supra note 193.

197. See Kevin R. Binning, "It's Us Against the World": How Distrust in Americans Versus
People-in-GeneralShapes Competitive ForeignPolicy Preferences, 28 POL. PSYCHIOL. 777, 778-79
(2007).
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three Washington state counties were receiving harsher sentencing
recommendations than white youth charged with the same crimes,
sociologists George Bridges and Sara Steen conducted a comprehensive
analysis of 233 narrative reports that county probation officers wrote.198
After controlling for factors such as age, gender, and offense history,
Bridges and Steen observed that officers' written rationales for sentencing
recommendations indicated that they were more likely to attribute criminal
behavior of minority youth to "internal forces," such as personal failure,
inadequate moral character, and personality, and the criminal behavior of
white youth to "external forces," such as poor home life, lack of appropriate
role models, and environment, even when objective risk factors associated
with the youth were similar.199 The officers were also more likely to have a
negative reaction to African-American youth when assessing subjective
factors, like level of remorse or cooperativeness, and conclude that only state
intervention could change their delinquent behavior. 200 To illustrate their
point, Bridges and Steen compared the manner in which one probation
officer depicted two seventeen-year-old boys, Ed and Lou. 201 Neither had a
criminal history, and both were charged with first-degree robbery.202 Ed,
however, was African-American, while Lou was white.
This robbery was very dangerous as Ed confronted the victim with
a loaded shotgun. He pointed it at the victim and demanded money
be placed in a paper bag.

. .

. There is an adult quality to this

referral. In talking with Ed, what was evident was the relaxed and
open way he discussed his lifestyle. There didn't seem to be any
desire to change. There was no expression of remorse from the
young man. There was no moral content to his comment.203
Lou is the victim of a broken home. He is trying to be his own
man, but ... is seemingly easily misled and follows other
delinquents against his better judgment. Lou is a tall emaciated
little boy who is terrified by his present predicament. It appears

198. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments ofJuvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 554, 554, 557
(1998).
199.

Id at 561-67.

200. Id. at 554-57 (describing the officers' recommendations as being more likely to advocate
commitment and confinement).
201.

Id. at 564.

202.

Id.

203.

Id.
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that he is in need of drug/alcohol evaluation and treatment.2
In 2004, Professors Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery expanded on
elements of Bridges and Steen's research. 2 05 The participants included a
racially diverse and gender-balanced group of ninety-one juvenile probation
officers in Los Angeles. 206 Members of Experiment 1, police officers, were
first asked to perform what the researchers called a "mind-clearing task,"
which required them to track a string of letters on a rapidly flashing
computer screen.207 Amid the flashing letters, however, certain officers were
subliminally exposed to words commonly associated with AfricanAmericans (such as black, homeboy, rap, etc.), while others were exposed to
race-neutral words. 208 The researchers then asked participants to read two
vignettes about a hypothetical adolescent who allegedly committed either a
property crime or an assault. 209 In both, "the race of the offender was left
unstated and the scenarios were ambiguous about the causes of the
crime." 210 After reading the vignettes, the probation officers rated the
offender on various personal traits, such as hostility and immaturity, and
"made judgments about the offender's culpability, expected recidivism, and
deserved punishment." 211 In contrast to subjects who did not receive the
racial priming, the probation officers who were exposed to the subliminal
messaging "judged the alleged offender to be less immature and more
violent ... more culpable, more likely to reoffend, and more deserving of
punishment," and "their global trait ratings were more negative."212

204.

Graham & Lowery, supranote 170, at 564.

205.

Id. at 484.

206.

Id

207.

Id. at 488, 495.

208.

Id. at 488-90.
The 16 race prime words in the first list were graffiti, Harlem, homeboy, jerricurl,
minority, mulatto, negro, rap, segregation, basketball, black, Cosby, gospel, hood,
Jamaica, and roots. The words in the second list were afro, Oprah, [I]slam, Haiti, pimp,
dreadlocks, plantation, slum, Tyson, welfare, athlete, ghetto, calypso, reggae, rhythm,
and soul. The 16 words in the first race-neutral list were baby, enjoyment, heaven,
kindness, summer, sunset, truth, playful, accident, coffin, devil, funeral, horror,
mosquito, stress, and toothache. The words in the second race-neutral list were
warmth, trust, sunrise, rainbow, pleasure, paradise, laughter, birthday, virus, paralysis,
loneliness, jealousy, hell, execution, death, and agony.
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Amazingly, the results were consistent even among officers who selfreported, and likely believed, that they held no racial bias toward

minorities. 2 13
Taken together, these experiments tell us several important things. First,
they reveal that even those whom we might assume to be immune to racial
primes and stereotypes linking young black males with criminality,
amorality, and adultness (the police and probation officers whose job it is to
provide professional assessments of adolescent offenders on a daily basis)
are not. Indeed, while the rhetoric of the "super-predator" war might have
influenced them less than members of the general public by virtue of their
professional training,214 it likely affected them nonetheless. Second is the
apparent extent to which even subliminal racial primes can influence our
perceptions of individuals. That the mere evocation of terms associated with
African-Americans could trigger assumptions about the relative culpability
of an individual offender is stunning. Third, and perhaps most notable, is the
degree to which race aligns with perceived amorality. In the collective
subconscious of these decision-makers and, the evidence suggests, in our
collective American subconscious, young black males are often associated
with "adult qualit[ies]," little "desire to change," "no . . . remorse," and "no
moral content." 2 15 We perceive them as "less immature," "more
violent," "more culpable, more likely to reoffend, and more deserving of
punishment" than their white counterparts. 216 While these associations may
also be the product of the history of race relations in this country, strategic
politics, and crime rates inasmuch as they are the product of the "superpredator" war, we cannot ignore the role of the "super-predator" war, and
social wars in general, in shaping our social cognition.
IV. CONCLUSION

The rest of the Western world was not immune from the spike in
adolescent crime, the political posturing, the public outcry, and the shifts in
penal ideology that impacted the United States during the late 1980s and

213. Id. ("When an ethnicity was incorrectly reported, respondents again were more likely to
'recall' that the alleged offender was African-American than either Latino or White.").
214. Generalized research shows that subliminal racial cues are less likely to interfere with
performance and judgment when the subject has been trained for the task at hand. See, e.g., Joshua
Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1326 (2002) (suggesting that
training participants to distinguish guns from cell phones may reduce "Shooter Bias").
215.

See supranotes 203-04 and accompanying text.

216.

See supranote 212 and accompanying text.
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1990s. 2 17 Yet no other country in the Western world turned so abruptly and
completely on its population of adolescent lawbreakers. Plainly, there are
important historical, sociological, political, and demographic differences
between the United States and other Western nations that influence the
relative severity of their juvenile justice policies, but this Article argues that
there is also something about the social psychology of these metaphorical,
social wars in which our country has been so continually and readily
involved. In the case of the "super-predator" war, these cognitive processes
and reverberations have so indelibly altered the meaning of "young black
male" within our society that we are immune to the notion that we are
systematically destroying a significant portion of our country's future.

217. Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 495, 495-96
(2004) (noting that, following murders by youthful offenders in Britain, Canada, and Australia, an
overall increase in violent juvenile crime, increased media attention, and "get tough" politicians,
juvenile crime became the single most discussed criminal justice issue in Western nations during the
1990s, but that the measures adopted in the United States were the most punitive).

